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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 34A-2-801(8)(a), Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-16 and Utah Code
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(a).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The correction of error standard applies to the review of the Labor Commission's
construction of a statute, Thomas v. Color Country Management, 2004 UT 12 f 19, 84 P.3d
1201; Wood v. Labor Commission, 2005 UT App 490 If 5, 128 P.3d 41, 43, and to the review of
its decisions regarding the constitutionality of the application of a statute to a given set of facts,
Velarde v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 123 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). In this case, however, the
Labor Commission lacked jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of the statute in question,
and thus this court will decide that issue de novo,
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
This case arises at the intersection of two "wage-replacement" elements of
American worker-protection legislation:

workers compensation and Social Security.

Both are aimed at protecting employees and their dependents from the adverse effects of
wage loss. Workers compensation insures against a portion of the wages lost as a result
of on-the-job injuries.

Social Security provides limited protection against wage

reductions expected when workers reach retirement age or become disabled.
Because these two programs share a common goal, both workers compensation
and Social Security laws include "coordination of benefits" provisions. Under Social
Security law, the sum of workers compensation and Social Security disability benefits
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may not exceed 80% of the worker's "average current earnings." 42 U.S.C. § 424(a); 20
C.F.R. § 404.408. Under the workers compensation provision at issue in this case,
workers compensation wage-loss benefits are reduced, after a base period of 312 weeks,
by 50% of the Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the
same period. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(5) (2004) ("§ 413(5)").
Such coordination provisions recognize the overlapping nature of these two
programs. They reduce the costs of administering such systems by limiting multiple
recoveries from both workers compensation insurance and Social Security. In light of
these prudent goals, both Social Security and workers compensation coordination
provisions have been routinely upheld by the courts against constitutional challenges like
those asserted in this case. See Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 82 (1971) (upholding
Social Security offset provision against constitutional challenge); John Tobin ys Case, 675
N.E.2d 781, 784 (Mass. 1997) (asserting that "there is universal agreement that [such]
statutes ... promote legitimate governmental goals and do not violate rights of equal
protection").
This court should follow those precedents and uphold the constitutionality of §
413(5). Merrill dresses his arguments in constitutional garb, but ultimately he is asking
this court to second-guess the legislature's policy judgment as to the appropriate level of
workers compensation benefits. Nothing in the Utah Constitution provides a foothold for
that argument. Instead, under the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause § 413(5) should be
upheld if it is reasonably related to a legitimate legislative goal. Ryan v. Gold Cross

Servs., Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1995).

Section 413(5) easily satisfies that

deferential standard, and Merrill's appeal should be rejected.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

WORKERS COMPENSATION
Before the universal enactment of workers compensation laws, workplace injuries

were subject to the uncertainties and complexities of the tort system. An employee who
lost his ability to earn wages as a result of an industrial accident could recover
compensation only if he could survive the protracted gauntlet of a civil tort suit—by
showing negligence on the part of the employer and by defeating any contributory
negligence or other defenses advanced in the suit.
Workers compensation represents a fundamental compromise between workers
and their employers, both of whom gave something up in substituting an administrative
system of workers compensation for the common-law tort system.1

Under workers

compensation law, workers who suffer workplace injuries are entitled to compensation
without any proof of fault or negligence on the part of the employer.

Workers

compensation awards are thus available under a much more streamlined, efficient
procedure than that available under the tort system. See Park Utah Consolidated Mines
Co. v. Ind. Comm'n, 36 P.2d 979, 981 (Utah 1934) (noting that the Utah Workers
Compensation Act "affords, through administrative bodies, injured industrial workmen or
their dependents simple, adequate, and speedy means of securing compensation," and

1

The elements of the tradeoff or compromise inherent in the Utah Workers
Compensation Act are summarized in tabular form in Addendum 1 hereto.
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explaining that the workers compensation system is designed "to substitute a more
humanitarian and economical system of compensation" for the cumbersome, sluggish tort
scheme that preceded it) (quoting Gonzales v. Chino Copper Co., 222 P. 903, 904 (N.M.
1924)).
At the same time, a workers compensation award is more limited than a
compensatory damages award in tort. "A compensation system, unlike a tort recovery,
does not pretend to restore to the claimant what he or she lost; it gives claimant a sum
which ... will presumably enable claimant to exist without being burden to others. ...
[T]he amount of compensation awarded may be expected to go not much higher than is
necessary to keep the worker from destitution." Larson's Workers' Compensation Law §
1.03[5](2006).
Such limited benefits, moreover, are the exclusive remedy of a worker covered by
the Workers Compensation Act. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105 "A central idea of the
compensation movement was that a complying employer, in exchange for accepting
compensation liability without fault, would be relieved of additional liability beyond the
benefits provided by the Compensation Act in cases where his negligence may have
contributed to the injury." Oliveras v. Caribou-Four Corners, Inc., 598 P.2d 1320, 1323
(Utah 1979).
Workers compensation awards are funded entirely by the employer. Employers
must secure the payment of workers compensation benefits by purchasing a workers'
compensation policy from a licensed insurance carrier or by establishing a self-funded
program authorized by the Labor Commission. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-201
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Injured workers may be eligible for benefits in the form of disability payments,
wage-loss compensation, and payment of medical expenses. The nature and extent of
benefits depend in part on whether the injury is classified as a Temporary Total Disability
(TTD) (Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-410), a Temporary Partial Disability (TPD) (§ 34A-2411), a Permanent Partial Disability (PPD) (§ 34A-2-412), or a Permanent Total
Disability (PTD) (§ 34A-2-413). In this case, appellant Merrill suffered a PTD, meaning
that he was deemed unable to return to gainful employment. An employee like Merrill
who suffers a PTD is entitled to payment of his medical expenses and also to wage-loss
compensation of two-thirds of his weekly wage, up to a maximum of $395. Utah Code
Ann. § 34A-2-413(2).
Workers compensation legislation requires an ongoing legislative policy judgment
as to the appropriate level of wage-replacement benefits—a level that properly balances
the need to provide partial wage-replacement for employees against the goal of assuring
an efficient system that is economical for employers. Coordination of benefits provisions
are one mechanism for balancing these objectives.
Such provisions extend beyond the statutory provision at issue in this case. Under
the Utah Workers Compensation Act, for example, any recovery from a third party serves
to offset the benefits due under workers compensation. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5)
(third-party recovery "shall be paid to the injured employee ... to be applied to reduce or
satisfy in full any obligation thereafter accruing against the person liable for [workers]
compensation"). As the Utah Supreme Court has indicated, this provision advances the
important goal of avoiding "[djouble recovery for injuries or death sustained in
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conjunction with an accident covered by workers' compensation." Esquivel v. Labor
Commission, 2000 UT 66, | 23; see also id. f 31 (explaining that "because a double
recovery is not permitted/5 the workers compensation beneficiary "must apply this total
balance to reduce or satisfy [the workers compensation insurer's] future obligation").
Section 413(5) has a similar goal. During the House floor debates on the bill that
led to this provision, representatives expressed concern about the rising costs and
insurance premiums associated with workers compensation insurance.

H.R., Floor

Debate, 47th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 16, 1988). The Social Security offset provision
was seen as a way to limit the cost of workers compensation coverage without imposing
an undue burden on injured workers. Id. With that in mind, § 413(5) assures an initial
base period of 312 weeks when full workers compensation wage-replacement benefits are
available without any Social Security offset.

After that period, however, the statute

provides for a reduction or offset of workers compensation benefits "by the dollar amount
of 50% of the Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the
same period." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 (2004).
II.

SOCIAL SECURITY
The Social Security benefit program at issue in this case is part of what is formally

known as Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance ("OASDI").

As the Social

Security Administration's website explains, the OASDI program "provides ... protection
against the loss of earnings due to retirement, disability and death." Overview of the
Social Security Administration (http://wvvw.ssa.gov/fmance/ 2006/Overview.pdf).

For

the most part, Social Security benefits are financed by the FICA tax on wages—which
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includes an employee contribution and an equal "matching" contribution from the
employer.
Like workers compensation benefits, Social Security does not provide complete
compensation for lost wages. Instead, "Social Security benefits are intended to replace a
portion of ... lost earnings and people are encouraged to supplement Social Security with
savings, pensions, investments, and other insurance. The monthly benefit amount to
which an individual (or qualifying survivors) may become entitled ... is based on the
individual's taxable earnings during his or her lifetime." Id.
The specific component of OASDI at issue here is the "retirement" benefit—also
known as "Old Age and Survivors Insurance" ("OASI"). "To qualify for OASI benefits,
a worker must have worked in Social Security covered employment or self-employment
and paid Social Security taxes ... for at least 10 years (40 credits) over the course of his
or her lifetime .... Working Americans can count on benefits when they retire, with
reduced benefits payable as early as age 62." Id. Thus, eligibility for Social Security
"retirement" or "old-age" benefits is not tied exclusively to age. Instead, eligibility
requires a showing of (a) work in "covered employment," (b) for a sufficient period of
time, and (c) application for benefits from age 62 on. See also Social Security Practice
Guide § 2.03 (Matthew Bender 2006); 20 CFR § 404.110 (1983). Thus, benefits are not
automatically awarded at any age; they are available only upon application and
compliance with eligibility requirements.
The amount of such benefits, moreover, turns in part on the age at which the
worker chooses to retire; reduced benefits are available upon early retirement at age 62,
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while full benefits may be awarded upon retirement and application at an older age. See
Social Security Online (http://www.ssa. gov/ retirechartred .htm).

Specifically, the

"retirement age" at which full benefits are available is determined by a sliding scale
depending on the worker's date of birth, which varies between age 65 and age 67. Id.
The Social Security OASDI system also includes a "Social Security Disability
Insurance" ("SSDI") component. SSDI "benefits provide a continuing income base for
eligible workers who have qualifying disabilities and for eligible members of their
families.... Workers are considered disabled if [the Social Security Administration]
determines that they have a physical or mental impairment that prevents them from
performing gainful work with earnings above a certain monthly amount. The disability
must have lasted, or be expected to last, for a continuous period of not less than 12
months or expect to result in death." Overview of the Social Security Administration
(http://wwav.ssa.gov/finance/2Q06/Overview.pdf).
For SSDI disability benefits, the Social Security Act includes a coordination or
"offset" provision with some parallels to § 413(5). Under 42 U.S.C. § 424(a), SSDI
benefits are subject to an offset for workers compensation benefits. Specifically, this
section provides that combined SSDI benefits and workers compensation benefits may
not exceed 80% of the worker's "average current earnings," or "ACE." As the Supreme
Court explained in upholding the constitutionality of this provision, this "offset reflected
a judgment by Congress that the workmen's compensation and disability insurance
programs in certain instances reflected a common purpose." Richardson v. Belcher, 404
U.S. 78, 82 (1971). In considering the overlap between these two programs, Congress
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determined that "a typical worker injured in the course of his employment and eligible for
both state and federal benefits received compensation for his disability in excess of his
take-home pay prior to the disability." Id. at 8 2 - 8 3 .

The Social Security offset

provision thus "reduced the duplication inherent in the programs and at the same time
allowed a supplement to workmen's compensation where the state payments were
inadequate." Id. at 83.
In the Richardson case, the plaintiff challenged the rationality of the statute on the
ground that it did not provide for any offset for private insurance recoveries.

The

Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding a sound basis for this differential
treatment:
We have no occasion, within our limited function under the Constitution, to
consider whether the legitimate purposes of Congress might have been better
served by applying the same offset to recipients of private insurance, or to judge
for ourselves whether the apprehensions of Congress were justified by the facts. If
the goals sought are legitimate, and the classification is rationally related to the
achievement of those goals, then the action of Congress is not so arbitrary as to
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 84; see also Lofty v. Richardson, 440 F.2d 1144, 1151-52 (6th Cir. 1971) (rejecting
the same argument on the grounds that (a) it is "relatively simple to enforce the
Workmen's Compensation deductions, whereas separating out the wage benefits from
civil damage judgments, or determining who had received private insurance benefits,
might offer administrative problems of a serious nature"; and (b) Social Security and
workers compensation are "more arguably duplicative of one another" since they are both
"social welfare legislation," whereas "[p]rivate accident or disability insurance is a
private contract, frequently paid for entirely by the recipient").
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III.

APPELLANT MERRILL'S WORKERS COMPENSATION AND SOCIAL
SECURITY BENEFITS.
The accident that caused appellant Nathan Merrill's disability occurred on May

14, 1998. Appellant's Brief ("App. Br.") at 7. Merrill was initially compensated, under a
compensation agreement approved by the Labor Commission, for a permanent partial
disability. Id. His injury was subsequently aggravated and permanent total disability
benefits of $395 per week were awarded effective August 28, 2001. Id. at 7 - 8.
Since the PTD award in 2001, Merrill has received the full slate of both workers
compensation and Social Security benefits—unreduced by any offset under the Social
Security Act or the Workers Compensation Act, and regardless of the fact that both
statutes provide overlapping protection for wage loss. These overlapping benefits will
continue without any offset, moreover, through August 2007. App. Br. at 14.
Merrill was 60 years old when the accident happened, and he was thus not eligible
for Social Security retirement benefits for another five years. Id. at 7 - 8. Merrill did
receive Social Security disability benefits, however, in the amount of $1,100 per month.
Id.

Combined with the $1,710 in Merrill's monthly workers compensation benefits,

Merrill has been receiving approximately $2,810 per month in wage-replacement
benefits. Id. at 1 3 - 1 4 .
Merrill's Social Security disability benefits were not offset by his workers
compensation benefits under the Social Security Act because the $2,810 sum never
exceeded 80% of his "average current earnings" ("ACE") under 42 U.S.C. § 424(a).
Because Merrill was earning about $57,200 in his last year of employment, his ACE was
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$4,766. Id. at 13. Since 80% of the ACE ($3,813) easily exceeded his combined Social
Security disability and workers compensation benefits ($2,810), Merrill was entitled to
recover from both wage-replacement sources—an overlapping recovery without any
offset.
Merrill's Social Security disability benefits were automatically converted to
retirement benefits when he reached full retirement age at 65. Id. at 8. Even then,
however, there was no offset under the Workers Compensation Act, since § 413(5)
provides for a period of full workers compensation benefits without any offset for Social
Security retirement benefits for a base period of 312 weeks. It is only after the end of
that base period that § 413(5) calls for a reduction of Merrill's $1,710 workers
compensation benefit by 50% of his Social Security retirement check. Thus, after August
2007, Merrill's monthly workers compensation benefit of $1,710 will be offset by about
$550—one half of his Social Security retirement check of about $1,100. App. Br. at 14.
Merrill understandably would prefer to continue to receive overlapping wagereplacement benefits from both sources. For Merrill, the § 413(5) offset will reduce the
level of his combined wage-replacement benefits package because the SSDI offset
provision of the Social Security Act is inoperative. For other workers, however, the §
413(5) offset would not result in a reduction of combined benefits as compared to the
total benefits available after the SSDI offset under 42 U.S.C. § 424(a).
Consider a hypothetical worker in Merrill's position with an ACE of $2,400. Such
a worker's Social Security disability benefits would be offset by his workers
compensation benefits. This is because his combined SSDI and PTD benefits of $2,810
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would exceed 80% of his ACE ($1,920). Under this scenario, the worker's SSDI benefit
of $1,100 per month would be reduced by $890—the amount necessary to reduce his
total benefits package to 80% of his ACE. See 20 CFR 404.408.
As this example shows, the § 413(5) offset will not always exceed the offset
imposed under the Social Security Act. Under the above hypothetical, the worker would
be entitled to a $2,260 compensation package after the § 413(5) offset under the Workers
Compensation Act, but only $1,920 after the 42 U.S.C. § 424(a) offset under the Social
Security Act.

Thus, in such circumstances § 413(5) would effectively increase the

worker's wage-replacement package of benefits as compared to those available under the
§ 424(a) offset of the Social Security Act.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Ultimately, the decision whether and to what extent to coordinate Social Security
and workers compensation benefits is a fundamental question of legislative policy. The
United States Congress enacted its approach to the overlap in these two schemes in §
424(a) of the Social Security Act. The Utah legislature has implemented its approach to
the overlapping benefit problem in the provision under review in this case. The wisdom
of these offsets is not a matter for judicial second-guessing under the guise of the
Constitution.
Merrill challenges § 413(5) under the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause of the
Utah Constitution, arguing (1) that the statute "does not apply equally to all persons
within the class created by the statute," in that it purportedly discriminates on the basis of
age and disability; and (2) that there is no "legitimate purpose" that is reasonably
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advanced by this provision. Both arguments fail. Merrill ignores the broad deference
afforded to legislative policy judgments like those inherent in § 413(5).

He also

mischaracterizes the purpose and function of the statute. Under a proper understanding
of the statute and of the governing deferential standards of review, MerrilPs appeal fails
as an improper attempt to second-guess the wisdom of the legislature's basic policy
judgment that a Social Security offset is a reasonable accommodation of the important,
countervailing interests at stake in determining an appropriate level of workers
compensation benefits.
Section 413(5) does not discriminate on the basis of age or disability, and it
reasonably advances the legislature's legitimate objective of preserving an economical
workers compensation system by limiting the availability of overlapping benefits. Thus,
and in accordance with extensive precedent in other jurisdictions, this court should reject
Merrill's constitutional challenge to § 413(5).
ARGUMENT
I.

SECTION 413(5) DOES NOT DISCRIMINATE ON THE BASIS OF A G E MUCH LESS DISABILITY.
Under longstanding precedent, the standard of review under the Uniform

Operation of Laws Clause turns in the first instance on whether the statutory
classification at issue involves a "fundamental right" or "suspect classification." Tindley
v. Salt Lake City School Dist., 2005 UT 30, | 28. Laws that implicate fundamental rights
or discriminate on the basis of a "suspect classification" are subject to a "heightened
degree of scrutiny." Utah Safe to Learn-Safe to Worship Coalition, Inc. v. State, 2004
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UT 32, Tf 31. Where no such fundamental rights or suspect classes are involved,
however, a much more deferential standard applies. This deferential standard asks only
"'(I) whether the classification is reasonable, (2) whether the legislative objectives are
legitimate, and (3) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the two.5" Peterson
v. Coca-Cola USA, 2002 UT 42, P23, 48 P.3d 941 (quoting Ryan v. Gold Cross Servs.,
Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1995)).
Merrill appears to concede that the deferential standard applies, since his challenge
to § 413(5) is based on the assertion that the statute is not reasonably related to any
legitimate statutory purpose. Thus, Merrill seems to agree that the constitutionality of the
statute turns on the existence of a legitimate statutory purpose and the relationship
between that purpose and the Social Security offset provision. That issue is discussed in
section II below.
Puzzlingly, however, Merrill also asserts that § 413(5) may be read on its face to
discriminate on the basis of age—or even disability. Both of these arguments also fail.
First, it should be noted that Merrill fails to cite any authority for the proposition that ageor disability-based classifications are inherently suspect. Merrill baldly asserts—without
citing any authority whatsoever—that a disability-based classification "would invoke
strict scrutiny of the statute." App. Br. at 17. In fact, precedent overwhelmingly rejects
Merrill's assertion.
As to age, the Utah Supreme Court repeatedly has acknowledged that "age has not
been determined to be ... a suspect classification." State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 399 (Utah
1989); Purdie v. University of Utah, 584 P.2d 831, 833 (Utah 1978). As to disability,
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"[i]t is well established that disability is not a suspect class for purposes of equal
protection analysis." Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993); see also State ex rel N.R.
v. State of Utah, 967 P.2d 951, 955 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (refusing to depart from federal
precedent and holding "that the disability-based classification in this case is not subject to
strict scrutiny").
In any event, Merrill is demonstrably wrong in asserting that § 413(5)
discriminates on the basis of age or disability. Merrill identifies two classes under the
statute:

(1) injured workers who "are eligible to receive Social Security retirement

benefits," and (2) injured workers "who will not receive and are not eligible for Social
Security retirement benefits." App. Br. at 15. According to Merrill, "[t]he chronological
age of the claimant is the only distinguishing factor between the two classes." Id. This
argument mischaracterizes applicable eligibility rules under the Social Security Act. As
explained above, eligibility for Social Security retirement benefits depends not simply on
age but on a history of having worked in "Social Security covered employment" for a
sufficient period of time. 20 C.F.R. § 404.110 (1983); Social Security Administration
Overview (http://www.ssa.gov/finance/2006/Overview.pdf).

If an injured worker has

been employed outside of "Social Security covered employment" (i.e., in employment
that does not contribute to the Social Security trust fund), or has not been employed for a
sufficient period of time, he will not be eligible for Social Security retirement benefits
regardless of his age. Id.
Thus, § 413(5) does not discriminate on the basis of age. The distinction it draws
is based only on the actual receipt of Social Security retirement benefits—which
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depends, in turn, not only on the injured worker's work history but also on his successful
completion of the necessary application and paperwork.

Although a worker first

becomes eligible for reduced retirement benefits at age 62, full benefits are not available
until "full retirement age"—which is somewhere between age 65 and age 67, depending
on the applicant's year of birth.
A worker's age is therefore no guarantee of receipt of retirement benefits, and it is
the latter (not the former) that triggers an offset under § 413(5). For reasons amplified
below, moreover, this is a natural, sensible distinction; it recognizes that Social Security
retirement and workers compensation are both elements of a broader wage-replacement
system funded by the employer, and that coordination makes more sense than
overlapping benefits.
Merrill likewise errs in suggesting that § 413(5) discriminates on the basis of
disability.

The statute is entirely uniform in its treatment of those who have suffered a

disability from an on-the-job accident, and it makes no classification whatsoever on that
basis.

All individuals who are eligible for workers compensation benefits are

presupposed to have suffered some sort of workplace "disability," and all are equally
eligible for benefits under the Workers Compensation Act.

Section 413(5) does not

change that; it simply makes sub-classifications—within the broader class of all those
who have suffered a workplace injury—of those who are receiving Social Security
retirement benefits and those who are not.
The uniformity of the statute is not altered by the fact that some "able-bodied"
workers could take "the option of continuing to work" while also collecting their Social
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Security "retirement" benefits. App. Br. at 17. There is no doubt that there are some
unfortunate effects of workplace injuries that cannot adequately be remedied by the
workers compensation system. But that does not transform a uniform statutory provision
into one that discriminates on the basis of disability.
It would be administratively impossible to restrict the § 413(5) offset to those
workers who would not have availed themselves of the opportunity to continue working
beyond retirement age. A subjective rule along those lines would invite extensive abuse,
since any worker could plausibly assert that he would have chosen to work past age 65.
Thus, the objective rule in § 413(5) is the only reasonable way to coordinate these two
sources of wage-replacement benefits.

Indeed, the objectivity of § 413(5) only

underscores its uniformity, and undermines Merrill's attempt to characterize it as
discriminatory.
For all of these reasons, Merrill has utterly failed to identify any unreasonable—
much less "suspect"—classification in § 413(5). The statute classifies workers on the
basis of their receipt of Social Security retirement benefits, not age or disability. That
classification, moreover, follows naturally and reasonably from the statutory goal of
limiting overlapping benefits and controlling insurance premiums (as explained in detail
below).
Thus, § 413(5) is subject to a deferential standard of review, not strict scrutiny.
Indeed, although Merrill's brief reads as if this were a case of first impression, the courts
have universally applied a deferential standard of review in upholding Social Security
offset provisions of workers compensation laws.
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See Vogel v. Wells Fargo Guard

Services, 937 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Tenn. 1996) ("join[ing] other jurisdictions in applying
the rational basis test" in upholding a similar statute); Harris v. Dept. of Labor andlnds.,
843 P.2d 1056, 1064 (Wash. 1993) (concluding that a similar statute "is economic
legislation which neither sets up a suspect class nor affects a fundamental right" and thus
that "rational basis review is appropriate"); Keith v. Hopple Plastics, 178 S.W.3d 463,
466 (Ky. 2005) (emphasizing that the standard of review in such cases does not "concern
whether the statute fulfills ideal social or economic objectives or whether it could have
been more just and humane").
II.

SECTION 413(5) IS REASONABLY RELATED TO LEGITIMATE
GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS IN AVOIDING OVERLAPPING
BENEFITS AND CONTROLLING THE COSTS OF WORKERS
COMPENSATION.
Merrill also fails in his attempt to challenge § 413(5)'s reasonable advancement of

legitimate governmental objectives. The legitimate goals of the statute are indisputable.
The Workers Compensation Act has long been understood to be aimed at providing
"simple, adequate, and speedy" compensation for workplace accidents, Park Utah
Consolidated Mines, 36 P.2d at 981, and § 413(5) is an integral part of the legislature's
ongoing effort to strike the right balance. The "adequacy" of a workers compensation
benefit is a quintessential question of legislative policy. It is informed not only by a
subjective determination of the basic, "simple" needs of an injured worker, but also by
the goal of assuring a "speedy," economical system that is affordable to employers.
Merrill's "constitutional" challenge is a misguided attempt to substitute his own
subjective policy judgments for those of the legislature. He unabashedly asserts that the
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§ 413(5) offset is a "dismal way for the industry to save money"; that it provides an
insufficient "benefit to the injured worker in return" for the cost-savings for the
"employer or its insurance carrier"; and that "emphasis on policies to reduce workplace
accidents, increase workplace safety and find ways to ... return an injured worker back to
the workplace sooner ... would ultimately save the industry much more money than
reducing the income of our State's senior citizens." App. Br. at 19. Such arguments
betray the true nature of this proceeding.

Merrill falls far short of identifying any

constitutional defect in § 413(5). He simply believes that the legislature struck the wrong
balance in reducing the benefits available to injured workers. Such arguments are fair
game in future lobbying efforts in the legislature, but they are not a basis for a judicial
override of the balance struck in the current statute.2
In the case of economic regulation, the Utah courts give "broad deference to the
legislature when scrutinizing the reasonableness of its classifications and their
relationship to legitimate legislative purposes." Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah v.
State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989). "[I]t is not [the courts'] function to defend the
merits, desirability, or rationality of legislative action. Rather, [the judicial] function is to
examine the reasonableness of the classification in light of legislative objectives." Ryan,
903 P.2d at 426. Moreover, deference to legislative classifications is not confined to the

2

The limited offset for Social Security benefits in § 413(5) is just one of a wide range of
provisions that dictate the amount of the wage replacement benefit available under the
Workers Compensation Act. If this court were to accept Merrill's invitation to question
the wisdom of § 413(5), that would open the door to judicial second-guessing of any of a
number of other provisions in the Act.
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purposes expressly identified by the legislature; the courts should sustain legislative
action "if there are any conceivable facts that would justify the action." Id. at 427.
Section 413(5) easily satisfies these deferential standards. It reasonably advances
the important objective of preserving an economical workers compensation system by
limiting the availability of overlapping benefits. The Utah Supreme Court has expressly
endorsed the legitimacy of the goal of avoiding "double recovery" in workers
compensation benefits and the reasonableness of coordination of benefits provisions in
advancing that goal. Esquivel v. Labor Commission, 2000 UT 66 at f 23 (noting that
coordination of benefits provision in Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5) advances the
important goal of avoidance of "[d]ouble recovery for injuries or death sustained in
conjunction with an accident covered by workers' compensation").
Section 413(5) reasonably advances this same objective. In other jurisdictions
where similar provisions have been challenged, the courts consistently have deferred to
the legislative goal of limiting overlapping recoveries. See Brown v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 599 P.2d 1031, 1036 (Kan. 1979) (concluding that Kansas offset provision
"prevents] a duplication of benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the
Social Security Act," thus "plac[ing] the worker in the same position as fellow workers
who have retired and are drawing old age social security benefits"); Keith, 178 S.W.2d at
467 (noting that workers compensation and Social Security both seek "to avoid
duplication of income replacement benefits, thereby reducing the cost of workers'
compensation and improving the economic climate for all of the state's citizens," and that
"coordinating systems of wage-loss protection by requiring an offset for duplicative
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income replacement benefits or placing a ceiling on combined benefits [is] viewed widely
as being sound public policy"); John Tobin's Case, 675 N.E.2d at 253 (explaining that
Massachusetts "coordination provision" "prevents] the stacking of benefits derived from
statutory ... schemes designed to serve a common purpose/' and alleviates "the burden
on employers"); Harris, 843 P.2d at 1066 - 66 (upholding Washington offset provision
as reasonably advancing goals of "avoiding duplication in benefits or 'double-dipping'"
and "[s]aving money for the state fund and reducing industrial insurance premiums");
Vogel, 937 S.W.2d at 859 (Tennessee provision "is rationally related to the goal of
assuring that employees have an adequate recovery").3
Merrill's only retort to this argument is the puzzling assertion that "Social Security
retirement benefits are not wage replacement benefits and hence there is no duplication of
benefits to be avoided." App. Br. at 20. This assertion is thoroughly undermined by the

3

As the Tennessee Supreme Court noted in Vogel, there is one outlier decision setting
aside a workers compensation provision as unconstitutional. See Industrial Claim
Appeals Office v. Romero, 912 P.2d 62, 66 (Colo. 1996). Unlike the Utah provision at
issue in this case, however, the Colorado statute provided for the outright termination of
permanent total workers compensation benefits "when the employee reaches the age of
sixty-five years," so that workers aged 65 and older were denied any benefits for workrelated injuries when they were permanently and totally disabled, but not when they
suffered only a partial or temporary disability. Id.
As the Vogel court noted, however, the Colorado provision is easily
distinguishable from the sort of provision at issue here and in the Vogel case. In this
case, as in Vogel, the statute provides a base period of full workers compensation benefits
and only a partial offset for Social Security retirement benefits. Such a provision clearly
advances legitimate governmental objectives, even if more draconian measures might
not. See Vogel, 937 S.W.2d at 860 - 61 (noting that unlike the Colorado statute, the
Tennessee statute "provides 260 weeks of benefits for any worker who becomes
permanently and totally disabled after age sixty regardless of the age," so that "[u]nlike
the Colorado statute, it does not deprive individuals like Vogel, seventy-three when
injured, of benefits").
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stated purpose of the OASDI program. See Social Security Administration Overview
(http://www.ssa.gov/finance/2006/Overview.pdf)

(explaining

that

Social

Security

retirement "provides ... protection against the loss of earnings due to retirement," and is
"intended to replace a portion of ... lost earnings"). It also ignores the undeniable fact
that "[t]he monthly benefit amount to which an individual (or qualifying survivors) may
become entitled ... is based on the individual's taxable earnings during his or her
lifetime." Id.
As the leading treatise on Workers Compensation explains, workers compensation
and Social Security are two components of our system of protection against wage loss.
Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 157-01 (2006). Such provisions are "designed
to restore the worker a portion ... of wages lost" due to two causes of wage-loss:
physical disability and old age. Id. "The crucial operative fact is that of wage loss; the
cause of the wage loss merely dictates the category of legislation applicable.

[I]f a

worker undergoes a period of wage loss due to [both] conditions, it does not follow that
he or she should receive [two] sets of benefits simultaneously....

The worker is

experiencing only one wage loss and, in any logical system, should receive only one
wage-loss benefit." Id.
It is certainly true, as Merrill notes, that "[p]eople who have reached full
retirement age can still work as well as receive full retirement benefits with absolutely no
reduction in benefits because of their earnings." App. Br. at 20. But that in no way
dispels the rationality of the § 413(5) offset. Indeed, as explained above, there is simply
no reasonable way to provide for a Social Security retirement offset without introducing
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the concern raised by Merrill. On one hand, an objective rule (as in § 413(5)) offsetting
Social Security retirement benefits against workers compensation would prevent an
injured worker who would otherwise have chosen to work past retirement age to receive
both Social Security retirement and actual wages. On the other hand, a subjective rule
accommodating Merrill's concern—permitting a worker to demonstrate, for example,
that he would have chosen to work beyond retirement age—would be entirely
unworkable as an invitation for abuse. The Utah legislature's preference for an objective
rule is at least "reasonable," and for that reason it should be upheld.
Merrill also points out that "[t]here is no requirement in the statute for a reduction
of [workers compensation] benefits due to the receipt of any other kind of retirement or
pension benefits." App. Br. at 12. That point is also true, but equally unavailing. As the
U.S. Supreme Court explained in rejecting a similar challenge to the rationality of the
Social Security offset provision, it is not within the "limited function" of the courts "to
consider whether the legitimate purposes of [the legislature] might have been better
served by applying the same offset to recipients of private insurance." Richardson, 404
U.S. at 84. The Utah legislature is certainly entitled to "address a problem in a piecemeal
fashion without violating an individual's rights" under the Constitution. Harris, 843 P.2d
at 1065.
Indeed, there is a sensible explanation for the legislature's decision to distinguish
private retirement benefits from Social Security and workers compensation. The former
are generally funded by the employee; the latter are employer-funded social programs
subject to comprehensive regulation. In light of these differences, there is a reasonable
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basis for the legislature's decision to offset Social Security but not private retirement: (1)
it is "relatively simple to enforce the Workmen's Compensation deductions, whereas
separating out the wage benefits from civil damage judgments, or determining who had
received private insurance benefits, might offer administrative problems of a serious
nature"; and (b) Social Security and workers compensation are "more arguably
duplicative of one another" since they are both "social welfare legislation," whereas
"[pjrivate accident or disability insurance is a private contract, frequently paid for
entirely by the recipient." Lofty, 440 F.2d at 1151-52.4
CONCLUSION
The legislative decision to adopt a limited offset of Social Security retirement
against workers compensation benefits is no more susceptible to constitutional challenge
than any of a wide range of legislative judgments in the Workers Compensation Act as to
the appropriate level of benefits. Ultimately, the wisdom of any such legislative policy
judgment is a matter for the legislature, not for the courts. Merrill's "constitutional"
challenge to § 413(5) should be rejected.

4

In fact, and as noted above, workers compensation coverage is paid for entirely by the
employer, whereas Social Security is funded by equal 50% contributions by the employer
and the employee. Thus, the 50% offset of Social Security retirement benefits is hardly
arbitrary; it is precisely parallel with the 50% contribution the employer has made toward
that benefit. That parallelism easily explains the rationality of § 413(5), and easily
sustains its constitutionality.
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ADDENDUM 1
U T A H W O R K E R S C O M P E N S A T I O N ACT
A C A R E F U L B A L A N C I N G OF R I G H T S .

Employer
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Injured Worker and/or
Dependent Heirs

Exclusive remedy U. C. A.
§34A-2-105.
Action can only be brought in
administrative proceedings.

1.

Speedy resolution. No lengthy jury trial
with its uncertainties. Less costly process
for the litigants. U.C.A. §§34A-2-801 &
802

A sure, predictable, though limited
remedy because of mandatory
insurance coverage. Less costly to
pursue.

2.

No fault system -- no reduction or
elimination of workers compensation
benefits by comparative fault.

3.

Comparatively speedy and
i n e x p e n s i v e
administrative
process. U.C.A. §§34A-2-801 & 802

4.

Wage replacement benefits: (1)
Temporary Total Disability—U.C.A.
§34A-2-410; (2) Temporary Partial
Disability—U.C.A. §34A-2-411; (3)
Permanent Total Disability—U.C.A.
§34A-2-413; (4) Death Benefits to
dependent heirs-U.C.A. §34A-2-414.

5.

Impairment/Loss of bodily function
benefits: Permanent Partial
Disability—U.C.A. §34A-2-412.

6.

Medical Expense benefits: U.C.A.
§34A-2-401.

7.

Preservation of right to pursue third parties
for full damages—U.C.A. §34A-2-106.

8.

Employer and employee on same side in
third party cases.

9.

Continuing jurisdiction of the industrial
Commission to modify awards based on
changes
in
injured
employee's
c o n d i t i o n . Utah Code Ann. §34A2-420

10.

All employees treated alike.

Limited, predictable fixed
damages.
a.

No pain and suffering damages.

b .

No projected future special
damages. Damages paid as they
accrue.

' B r o a d b a s e d r i s k spreading on
industry through mandatory insurance or
qualifying through bonding with Industrial
Commission to be a self-insured employer.
U.C.A. §34-A-2-201.
Right to be reimbursed from third
party recoveries §34A-2-106 minus
injured worker's attorney's fees and
costs incurred in collecting from the
third-party tortfeasor.
a.

Employer—"trustee" of the cause
of action for injured worker or
dependent heirs in death cases

b.

However, see U.C.A. §§34A-2106(5)(b), 78-27-39 & 78-27-41
regarding 40% subrogation and
third party defendant damage
limitation rule in third party civil
actions brought by injured
workers or dependent heirs in
death cases.

All employers treated alike.
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ADDENDUM 2 - PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY STATUTE
U.C.A. § 34A-2-413 - Permanent total disability — Amount of payments —
Rehabilitation.
(1) (a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from an industrial accident or
occupational disease, the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this section.
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the
employee must prove by a preponderance of evidence that:
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of impairments
as a result of the industrial accident or occupational disease that gives rise to the
permanent total disability entitlement;
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct cause of the
employee's permanent total disability.
(c) To establish that an employee is permanently totally disabled the employee must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed;
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that limit the
employee's ability to do basic work activities;
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of
impairments prevent the employee from performing the essential functions of the work
activities for which the employee has been qualified until the time of the industrial
accident or occupational disease that is the basis for the employee's permanent total
disability claim; and
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into
consideration the employee's:
(A) age;
(B) education;
(C) past work experience;
(D) medical capacity; and
(E) residual functional capacity.
(d) Evidence of an employee's entitlement to disability benefits other than those
provided under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, if relevant:
(i) may be presented to the commission;
(ii) is not binding; and
(iii) creates no presumption of an entitlement under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah
Occupational Disease Act.
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-week
entitlement, compensation shall be 66-2/3% of the employee's average weekly wage at
the time of the injury, limited as follows:
(a) compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average weekly
wage at the time of the injury;
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(b) compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per week, plus $5
for a dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to
a maximum of four dependent minor children, but not exceeding the maximum
established in Subsection (2)(a) nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee
at the time of the injury; and
(c) after the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate under
Subsection (2)(b) shall be 36% of the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the
nearest dollar.
(3) This Subsection (3) applies to claims resulting from an accident or disease
arising out
of and in the course of the employee's employment on or before June 30, 1994.
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks of
permanent total disability compensation except as outlined in Section 34A-2-703 as in
effect on the date of injury.
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation
for any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections
34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Part 5, Industrial Noise, in excess of the amount of
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total
disability compensation rate under Subsection (2).
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be reimbursed to the employer or
its insurance carrier by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee.
(d) After an employee has received compensation from the employee's employer, its
insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of disabilities
amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable permanent total disability
compensation rate, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining permanent
total disability compensation.
(e) Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the
employer or its insurance carrier has satisfied its liability under this Subsection (3) or
Section 34A-2-703.
(4) This Subsection (4) applies to claims resulting from an accident or disease
arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment on or after July 1, 1994.
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for permanent total disability
compensation.
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation
for any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections
34A-2-41Q through 34A-2-412 and Part 5, Industrial Noise, in excess of the amount of
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total
disability compensation rate under Subsection (2).
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be recouped by the employer or its
insurance carrier by reasonably offsetting the overpayment against future liability paid
before or after the initial 312 weeks.
(5) Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the
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compensation payable by the employer, its insurance carrier, or the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund, after an employee has received compensation from the employer or
the employer's insurance carrier for any combination of disabilities amounting to 312
weeks of compensation at the applicable total disability compensation rate, shall be
reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% of the Social
Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same period.
(6) (a) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability is not final, unless
otherwise agreed to by the parties, until:
(i) an administrative law judge reviews a summary of reemployment activities
undertaken pursuant to Chapter 8, Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act;
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits to the administrative law judge:
(A) a reemployment plan as prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider
reasonably
designed to return the employee to gainful employment; or
(B) notice that the employer or its insurance carrier will not submit a plan; and
(iii) the administrative law judge, after notice to the parties, holds a hearing, unless
otherwise stipulated, to:
(A) consider evidence regarding rehabilitation; and
(B) review any reemployment plan submitted by the employer or its insurance
carrier under Subsection (6)(a)(ii).
(b) Before commencing the procedure required by Subsection (6)(a), the
administrative law judge shall order:
(i) the initiation of permanent total disability compensation payments to provide for
the employee's subsistence; and
(ii) the payment of any undisputed disability or medical benefits due the employee.
(c) Notwithstanding Subsection (6)(a), an order for payment of benefits described in
Subsection (6)(b) is considered a final order for purposes of Section 34A-2-212.
(d) The employer or its insurance carrier shall be given credit for any disability
payments made under Subsection (6)(b) against its ultimate disability compensation
liability under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act.
(e) An employer or its insurance carrier may not be ordered to submit a
reemployment plan. If the employer or its insurance carrier voluntarily submits a plan,
the plan is subject to Subsections (6)(e)(i) through (iii).
(i) The plan may include retraining, education, medical and disability compensation
benefits, job placement services, or incentives calculated to facilitate reemployment
funded by the employer or its insurance carrier.
(ii) The plan shall include payment of reasonable disability compensation to provide
for the employee's subsistence during the rehabilitation process.
(iii) The employer or its insurance carrier shall diligently pursue the reemployment
plan. The employer's or insurance carrier's failure to diligently pursue the reemployment
plan shall be cause for the administrative law judge on the administrative law judge's own
motion to make a final decision of permanent total disability.
(f) If a preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not
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possible, the administrative law judge shall order that the employee be paid weekly
permanent total disability compensation benefits.
(7) (a) The period of benefits commences on the date the employee became
permanently totally disabled, as determined by a final order of the commission based on
the facts and evidence, and ends:
(i) with the death of the employee; or
(ii) when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady work.
(b) An employer or its insurance carrier may provide or locate for a permanently
totally disabled employee reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work in a job
earning at least minimum wage provided that employment may not be required to the
extent that it would disqualify the employee from Social Security disability benefits.
(c) An employee shall fully cooperate in the placement and employment process and
accept the reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work.
(d) In a consecutive four-week period when an employee's gross income from the
work provided under Subsection (7)(b) exceeds $500, the employer or insurance carrier
may reduce the
employee's permanent total disability compensation by 50% of the employee's income in
excess of $500.
(e) If a work opportunity is not provided by the employer or its insurance carrier, a
permanently totally disabled employee may obtain medically appropriate, part-time work
subject to the offset provisions contained in Subsection (7)(d).
(f) (i) The commission shall establish rules regarding the part-time work and offset,
(ii) The adjudication of disputes arising under this Subsection (7) is governed by
Part 8, Adjudication.
(g) The employer or its insurance carrier shall have the burden of proof to show that
medically appropriate part-time work is available.
(h) The administrative law judge may:
(i) excuse an employee from participation in any job that would require the
employee to undertake work exceeding the employee's medical capacity and residual
functional capacity or for good cause; or
(ii) allow the employer or its insurance carrier to reduce permanent total disability
benefits as provided in Subsection (7)(d) when reasonable, medically appropriate, parttime employment has been offered but the employee has failed to fully cooperate.
(8) When an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is
possible but the employee has some loss of bodily function, the award shall be for
permanent partial disability.
(9) As determined by an administrative law judge, an employee is not entitled to
disability compensation, unless the employee fully cooperates with any evaluation or
reemployment plan under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. The
administrative law judge shall dismiss without prejudice the claim for benefits of an
employee if the administrative law judge finds that the employee fails to fully cooperate,
unless the administrative law judge states specific findings on the record justifying
dismissal with prejudice.

(10) (a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both
arms, both feet, both legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body members
constitutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to this section.
(b) A finding of permanent total disability pursuant to Subsection (10)(a) is final.
(11) (a) An insurer or self-insured employer may periodically reexamine a
permanent total disability claim, except those based on Subsection (10), for which the
insurer or self-insured employer had or has payment responsibility to determine whether
the worker remains permanently totally disabled.
(b) Reexamination may be conducted no more than once every three years after an
award is final, unless good cause is shown by the employer or its insurance carrier to
allow more frequent reexaminations.
(c) The reexamination may include:
(i) the review of medical records;
(ii) employee submission to reasonable medical evaluations;
(iii) employee submission to reasonable rehabilitation evaluations and retraining
efforts;
(iv) employee disclosure of Federal Income Tax Returns;
(v) employee certification of compliance with Section 34A-2-110; and
(vi) employee completion of sworn affidavits or questionnaires approved by the
division.
(d) The insurer or self-insured employer shall pay for the cost of a reexamination
with
appropriate employee reimbursement pursuant to rule for reasonable travel allowance and
per diem as well as reasonable expert witness fees incurred by the employee in
supporting the employee's claim for permanent total disability benefits at the time of
reexamination.
(e) If an employee fails to fully cooperate in the reasomible reexamination of a
permanent total disability finding, an administrative law judge may order the suspension
of the employee's permanent total disability benefits until the employee cooperates with
the reexamination.
(f) (i) Should the reexamination of a permanent total disability finding reveal
evidence that reasonably raises the issue of an employee's continued entitlement to
permanent total disability compensation benefits, an insurer or self-insured employer may
petition the Division of Adjudication for a rehearing on that issue. The petition shall be
accompanied by documentation supporting the insurer's or self-insured employer's belief
that the employee is no longer permanently totally disabled.
(ii) If the petition under Subsection (1 l)(f)(i) demonstrates good cause, as
determined by the Division of Adjudication, an administrative law judge shall adjudicate
the issue at a hearing.
(iii) Evidence of an employee's participation in medically appropriate, part-time
work may not be the sole basis for termination of an employee's permanent total
disability entitlement, but the evidence of the employee's participation in medically
appropriate, part-time work under Subsection (7) may be considered in the reexamination
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or hearing with other evidence relating to the employee's status and condition.
(g) In accordance with Section 34A-1-309, the administrative law judge may award
reasonable attorneys fees to an attorney retained by an employee to represent the
employee's interests with respect to reexamination of the permanent total disability
finding, except if the employee does not prevail, the attorneys fees shall be set at $1,000.
The attorneys fees shall be paid by the employer or its insurance carrier in addition to the
permanent total disability compensation benefits due.
(h) During the period of reexamination or adjudication if the employee fully
cooperates, each insurer, self-insured employer, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund
shall continue to pay the permanent total disability compensation benefits due the
employee.
(12) If any provision of this section, or the application of any provision to any
person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this section shall be given effect
without the invalid provision or application.
Amended by Chapter 295, 2006 General Session
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NATHAN EL MERRILL,
Petitioner,
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER ON REMAND

vs.

Case Nos* 2003280 and 2003281

VERMAX OF FLORIDA, INC. dba
DAKOTA CABINETS and/or WORKERS
COMPENSATION FUND and/or
WAUSAU BUSINESS INS.,

Judge Richard M. La Jeunesse

Respondents,

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
On March 24,20051 a Final Order (the March 24,2005 Order) wherein I found and concluded
that Mr. Merrill's industrial accident on May 14,1998 while employed for Vermax of Florida,
Inc. dba Dakota Cabinets (Dakota Cabinets) rendered him permanently and totally disabled. In
the March 24,2005 Order I ordered Dakota Cabinets and its insurer Wausau Business Ins. to
commence payments of permanent total disability compensation as of August 28,. 2001 at the
rate of $395.00 per week.
Respondents Dakota Cabinets and Wausau Business Ins. (hereinafter respondents) filed a Motion
for Review as "to the March 24,2005 Order claiming an offset for permanent partial disability
compensation paid at a prior date. Respondents also requested language in the order allowing for
an offset with respect to social security retirement benefits received after the initial 312 weeks of
permanent total disability compensation.
On February 1, 2006 the Labor Commission issued an Order of Remand requesting additional
proceedings to clarify the offset issues. Consistent with the Order of Remand I required the
parties to file briefs on the offset issues and held a hearing on April 13,2006 where the parties
argued their respective briefs.
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n. ISSUES1.

Are respondents entitled to an offset of $6,770.40 paid to Nathan Merrill as permanent
partial disability compensation for the time period October 29, 1999 to May 8, 2000
related to a seven percent (7%) whole person impairment caused by the May 14, 1998
industrial injury, such offset to be deducted from his permanent total disability
compensation commencing August 28,2001?

2.

After payment ofthe first 312 weeks of permanent total disability compensation, are
respondents entitled to a reduction against such compensation of an amount representing
fifty percent (50%) of any social security retirement benefits received by Nathan Merrill?
i n . FINDINGS OF FACT.

I hereby adopt the Findings of Fact contained in my March 25,2004 Order insofar as they are
not inconsistent with the present order. Inadditioii, the parties stipulated that respondents paid
Mr. Merrill $6,770.40 in permanent partial disability compensation for a seven percent (7%)
whole person impairment caused by the May 14,1998 industrial injury. The $6,770,40 in
permanent partial disability compensation paid by respondents covered a 15 month period from
October 29,1999 to May 8,2000.
In sum, Mr. Merrill suffered a low back injury on May 14, 1998 while employed for Dakota
Cabinets that caused him to become permanently and totally disabled. The respondents paid Mr.
Merrill $6,770.40 in permanent partial disability compensation for a seven percent (7%) whole
person impairment caused by the May 14,1998 industrial injury. The $6,770.40 in permanent
partial disability compensation paid by respondents covered a 15 month period from October 29,
1999 to May 8, 2000. In the March 25,2005 Order I ordered respondents to pay Mr. Merrill
permanent total disability compensation of $395.00 per week commencing August 28,2001
when he ceased gainful employment
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IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
A.

Permanent Partial Disability Compensation Offset Issue.

Utah Code ^ 34A-2-413(4) states in relevant part that:
This subsection (4) applies to claims resulting from an accident or disease"arising
out of and in the course of the employee's employment on or after July 1,1994.
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for permanent total disability
compensation*
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for
any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections
34A-2-410 through 34A-2-4121 and Part 5, Industrial Noise in excess of the amount
of compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total
disability compensation rate under Subsection (2).
Respondents claim that in & permanent total disability case Utah Code § 34A~2-413(4) stands for
the proposition that any combination of workers' compensation benefits received at any time by
an injured worker for a specific injury cannot exceed 312 weeks of benefits paid at the
permanent total disability compensation rate during the first 312 weeks of permanent total
disability benefits. Specifically in this case, respondents assert that the $67770A0 in permanent
partial disability compensation paid to Mr. Merrill covering a 15 month period from October 29,
1999 to May 8,2000 should be offset against the first 312 weeks of permanent total disability
compensation paid to him commencing August 28,2001.
Respondents rely on the Utah Supreme Court case of Johnson v, Harsco/Heckett, 737 P. 2d 9S6
(Utah 1987) in support of their hypothesis. The Johnson case is factually inapposite in that it
involved an odd scenario where the Industrial Commission of Utah awarded an injured employee
312 weeks of temporary total disability compensation together with 312 weeks of permanent
partial disability compensation, but allowed an offset of one against the other. [Id. at 987]. An
award of 312 weeks of permanent partial disability compensation constituted a bizarre result in
and of itself as it implied a permanent partial impairment of 100% or the state of being almost
dead.2

1

Section 34A-2-410 applies to temporary total disability compensation. Section 34A-2-411 applies to temporary
partial disability compensation. Section 34A-2-412 applies to permanent partial disability compensation.

2

Utah's 2002 Impairment Guides state that an impairment of "100%" equaling a state approaching death." [See;
Utah's 2002 Impairment Guides p. 5].
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Respondents also urged that a plain reading of Utah Code § 34A-2-413(4) supports their position
that any combination of workers' compensation benefits received at any time by an injured
worker for a specific injury cannot exceed 312 weeks of benefits paid at the permanent total
disability compensation rate during the first 312 weeks of permanent total disability benefits.
However, in interpreting the statutory language several principles must be laid as groundwork.
The first and foremost rule of statutory construction as to the Workers' Compensation Act is:
The Act is a humanitarian and economical system designed to provide relief to the
victims of industrial accidents.
To give effect to that purpose, the Act should be liberally construed and applied to
provide coverage. Any doubt respecting the right of compensation will be
resolved in favor of the injured employee. [Burgess v. Siaperas Sand & Gravel,
965 P. 2d 583, 585 (Utah App. 1998).
The interpretation of Utah Code § 34A-2~413(4) urged by respondents would lead to extremely
harsh results in permanent total disability cases. A not improbable example involves the
employee severely injured who receives 312 weeks of temporary total disability compensation
during convalescence. Then the injured employee through determined and heroic effort returns
to work for a number of years before succumbing to the inexorable effects of the original serious
injury that now results in permanent total disability. The employee under respondents*
interpretation of Utah Code § 34A-2-413(4) must now wait six years (312 weeks) before
receiving any further workers'"compensation benefits though now permanently, totally disabled
and without income or means of support. Hardly the liberal construction designed to provide
humanitarian relief for victims"of industrial accidents as envisioned by the Act.
An interpretation of Utah Code § 34A-2-413(4) more consistent with the overall purposes of the
Workers' Compensation Act is that an injured worker cannot receive temporary total, or
pennanent partial, disability compensation concurrent with and overlapping the initial 312 weeks
of coverage awarded as permanent total disability compensation. This interpretation remains
consistent with the plain language of Utah Code § 34A-2-413(4)
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for
any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and
Sections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Part 5, Industrial Noise in excess of
the amount of compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable
permanent total disability compensationTate under Subsection (2). [emphasis
added]
The more liberal reading of the statute comports with the generally accepted rule pronounced by
Professor Larson applicable to the specific facts of the present matter:
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The usual holding is that the permanent partial award need not be deducted from
the subsequent permanent total award. ARTHUR LARSON & LEX LARSON, THE
LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION % 10.31(a) at 3-94(2000).
Accordingly, I conclude that the interpretation of Utah Code § 34A-2-413(4) most consistent
with the overall purpose of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, the generally accepted rules
construing such provisions arid the plain meaning of the statute is that an injured worker cannot
receive temporary total, or permanent partial, disability compensation concurrent with and
overlapping the initial 312 weeks of coverage awarded as permanent total disability
compensation. In the present case, Mr. Merrill received the $6,770.40 in permanent partial
disability compensation for a 15 month period from October 29,1999 to May 8,2000 that did
not overlap the first 312 weeks of permanent total disability compensation to be paid him
commencing August 28,200 L Therefore, the $6,770.40 in permanent partial disability
compensation should not be offset against Mr. Merrill's permanent total disability compensation.
B.

The Social Security Retirement Reduction Issue.

Utah Code § 34A~2-413(5) states:
Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the
compensation payable by the employer, its insurance carrier, or the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund, after an employee has received compensation from the
employer or the employer's insurance carrier for any combination of disabilities
amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable total disability
compensation rate, shall be reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar
amount of 50% of the "Social Security retirement benefits received by the
employee during the same period.
Mr. Merrill's constitutional challenge against Utah Code § 34A-2-413(5) stood as the only
dispute between the parties concerning the applicability of the Section. Since I do not have the
authority to rule on the constitutionality of Utah Code § 34A-2-413(5), the reduction set forth
therein must stand. Consequently, after respondents pay Mr. Merrill 312 weeks of permanent
total disability compensation they are entitled to a reduction in the required weekly payment of
$395.00 per month of an amount equal to 50% of any Social Security retirement benefits
received by Mr. Merrill during the same period of time.
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V. ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the parties shall abide by the terms ordered in my Final
Order issued on March 24, 2005 modified only as follows:
Respondents Vermax of Florida dba Dakota Cabinets and/or Wausau Business Ins, shall pay
Nathan Merrill permanent total disability compensation in the amount of $395.00 per week
commencing August 28,200L After payment of the first 312 weeks of permanent total
disability compensation paid by Vermax of Florida dba Dakota Cabinets and/or Wausau
Business Ins. they shall be entitled to reduce permanent total disability payments to Nathan
Merrill by 50% of any 3ocial~Security retirement benefits received by him for concurrent
periods.

DATED May 17, 2006.

Jeuixesse
Law Judge

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review
within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its
response. If none of the partie~s specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order, was mailed by prepaid U.S. postage on May 16,2006, to the persons/parties at
the following addresses:
Nathan H Merrill
26 Airline Dr
Clearfield UT 84015
Dakota Cabinets
1010 W Kershaw S
OgdenUT 84401
Phillip Shell Esq
45 E Vine St
Murray UT 84107
Michael E Dyer Esq
257E200SSte800
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Eugene Miller Esq
P O Box 57929
Salt Lake City UT 84107
Sharon J Eblen Esq
257E200SSte800
Salt Lake City UT 84111

UTAH LABQRCpMfflSS
, Adjud^caticjiJBivision
PO Box 146615
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615

XV

ADDENDUM 4 - FINAL LABOR COMMISSION ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR REVIEW

XVI

jto/-/?^*/-,-^

©

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
NATHAN H. MERRILL,
Petitioner,
vs.
VERMAX OF FLORIDA, INC., dba
DAKOTA CABINETS; WORKERS
COMPENSATION FUND; and WAUSAU
BUSINESS INSURANCE,

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW
Case No. 03-0280

Respondents,

Nathan H. Merrill asks the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative Law Judge La
Jeunessefs decision regarding Mr. Merrill's claim for benefits under the Utah Workers1
Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated).
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated §63-46b-12 and §34A-2-801(3).
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED
Judge La Jeunesse's Supplemental Order of May 17,2006, explains the background of Mr.
Merrill's claim and addresses two issues affecting the amount of Mr. Merrill's entitlement to
permanent total disability compensation. Those two issues are: 1) respondents7 right to offset
permanent partial disability compensation against permanent total disability compensation; and 2)
respondents' right under §34A-2-413(5) of the Act to reduce permanent total disability
compensation by an amount equal to 50% of Mr. Merrill's social security retirement benefit.
In resolving the two issues identified above, Judge La Jeunesse concluded that respondents
cannot offset permanent partial disability compensation against permanent total disability
compensation, but can, pursuant to §34A-2-413(5), reduce Mr. Merrill's permanent total disability
compensation by 50% of his social security retirement benefit.
In seeking Commission review of Judge La Jeunesse's decision, Mr. Merrill raises only one
issue—whether §34A-2-413(5) "is unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection clause of
the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution and the uniform operation of laws provision of
article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution."
RECEft

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW

M^Merrill does not argue that Judge La Jeunesse has misinterpreted or misapplied §34A-2JUN 3 0 2i
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413(5). Instead, Mr. Merrill's attack is aimed squarely at the constitutionality of the statute. It is
well settled that the adjudicative authority of the Commission is limited; it does not extend to
deciding constitutional questions. Instead, the Commission must presume that statutory provisions,
including the provisions of §34A-2-413(5), are constitutional On that basis, the Commission
declines to consider Mr. Merrill's constitutional arguments against §34A-2-413(5).
ORDER
The Commission affirms Judge La Jeunesse's decision and denies Mr. Merrill's motion for
review. It is so ordered.
At**
Dated this %] day of June, 2006.

R. Lee Ellertson
Utah Labor Commissioner
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order, Any such request for
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of
the date of this order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of
Nathan H. Merrill, Case No. 03-0280, was mailed first class postage prepaid this^^Say of June,
2006, to the following:
Nathan H. Merrill
26 Airline Dr
Clearfield UT 84015
Dakota Cabinets
1010 W Kershaw S
OgdenUT 84401
Phillip Shell, Esq.
45 E Vine St
Murray UT 84107
Michael E. Dyer, Esq.
257 E 200 S Ste 800
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Eugene Miller, Esq.
Workers Compensation Fund Legal Dept
PO Box 57929
Salt Lake City UT 84107
Sharon J. Eblen, Esq.
257 E 200 S Ste 800
Salt Lake City UT 84111

Sara Danielson
Utah Labor Commission

